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Aviation Policy & Requirements
• Two directives define the essential standards and organizational structure for 
aviation activity
• Safety requirements set here fall outside the Agency’s safety organization
• Agency Safety requirements are largely framed around large space-based programs
• Monetary provisioning is fractured being driven by diverse programmatic needs 
from space access/exploration, earth science and aeronautics.
• Generates a resulting need to offset institutional costs with reimbursable work.
• Works counter to an institutional asset view of the fleet.  Sum of all programmatic funds does 
not meet the institutional needs to sustain a fleet of operators/maintainers and aircraft
• In-house competition aggravates the problem.  
• Culturally the community largely sees each of 7 flight operations as 
• “unique”  both in how they conduct operations and perform/document maintenance. 
• Unwilling to accept the possibility that they are more deficient than the standard requires  
(essential flexibility) 
• Headquarters' Aircraft Management Division viewed as an impediment to Centers
Organizational Structure
• Headquarters Aircraft Management Division, small office that
• Is assigned under the Institutional Support Associate Administrator
• Ensures compliance with public law from everything from airframe 
airworthiness certification to lawful use of a “public” aircraft. 
• Leads interagency executive team consisting of the Directors of Flight Ops 
that self inspects and collaborates on policy and standards for the community.  
• Leads team of NASA program executives with Flight Directors to manage 
future aircraft utilization of the agency.
• Recent managerial concept met to overcome the community’s perceived unwillingness 
to make difficult calls to reduce redundant capacity   
Watershed  Event -2001
• Learjet Model 24 Landing Accident – Loss of asset/ No injuries
• Three Personnel on board (Pilot, Copilot and Observer)
• Aircraft entered a lateral PIO during flare that resulted in a hard landing
• Analysis by board with lead outside the Center indicated 
• Lack of adherence to currency and qualification standards
• Aircraft inexperience on the part of the PIC and copilot
• Failure of the PIC to detect a deteriorating situation and recover the aircraft
• Inappropriate Management Oversight
• Failure of Management to establish procedures
• Failure to adhere to standards
• Events are Opportunities (some are thrust upon us and others need 
seizing)
Corrective Actions
• Required documentation of training
• Outlined specific training events ground, simulator EP, written exam 
checkout flights and checkride and solo flights
• Established when flight with IP required
• Requal required after 1 year of non-currency
• Instituted supervisor responsibility ensure appropriate daily crew 
composition based upon risk factors.
• Prohibited aircrew from performing duties for which a documented 
program is not completed except via waiver
• Define qualifications and ensure adherence to OPM hiring standards
Personnel Actions
• Replaced several of the managers with the Flight Ops Chain of 
Command
• Replaced the Chief of S&MA with a pilot 
• Created an independent Aviation Safety Management position within 
Safety & Mission Assurance Directorate (outside the flight operations)
• Aviation Safety Officer still assigned  within flight ops
• Given direct access to Center Director
• Reassigned Aviation Safety Officer
First two years
• First day a close call occurs
• Opportunity or challenge?
• Establish policy and procedures for an active program
• Challenge- Assign responsibility while retaining cooperative approach
• Trained as a pilot
• Reinvigorate Investigation program
• Less catastrophic events were ignored
• Data collection hap-hazard
• Success (no major mishap) meant good enough
• Shift perception of where the gold lies
Aviation Safety Program Structure
• Three Key Elements
• Leadership
• Planning
• Risk Managements
• Stakeholders forum – Aviation Safety Council
• serves the Director of Flight Ops
• Reviews metrics
• Recommends actions
• Develops 1 year tactical plan 
• Assess impact of interim events
• Conduct and procure training 
Aviation Safety Council
• Heavily Maintenance in membership
• Practitioners with little time for bureaucracy (aircrew similar)
• Included Chief of Maintenance
• Flight Operations forum chartered to bring solutions
• Largely perceived as an organizational extension of the Safety Organization
• Expanded membership to include a project management representative
• Rotated lead with other members of Aviation Safety Management Team
• Working to make forum effective
• Ownership is essential
• Need mechanisms to move toward short-term solutions quickly 
• Ultimately enables cultural changes for the the long haul
Intervening years -significant events/forces
• Loss of Helios (UAV)
• Loss of the X-31
• Kingair Stall from excessive icing (all contractor crew)
• Shift from Aeronautics to Earth Science/reimbursable work
• Multiple projects competing for resources (manpower and time)
• Addition of SOFIA program (747 and 750 flight hours a year all at night)
• Implementation of common IT based maintenance management system
• ER-2 Regulator failure is catalyst event
• Shift from a multiple informal processes to a uniform process with experts from all 
disciplines
Significant Changes
• Incorporation of a fatigue risk management tool
• Manage high demands of multiple projects for extended operations at home 
and abroad
• Flight Doc created matrix/directive based upon Canadian tool 
• Targets both aircrew and maintenance personnel
• Acknowledges common  Human Factors Fatigue aspects ( duty day, night operations, 
continuous successive days of operation, crew rest, time zones shifts, etc..)
• Conflicts with the efficiencies gained by use of overtime
• Matrix becomes a toll to evaluate the risk
• May lead to an acceptance of an elevated risk by management
• Enables aircrew and maintenance to counter pressures from projects
Significant Thrusts
• Incorporation of a fatigue risk management tool
• Manage high demands of multiple projects for extended operations at home 
and abroad
• Flight Doc created matrix/directive based upon Canadian tool 
• Targets both aircrew and maintenance personnel
• Acknowledges common  Human Factors Fatigue aspects ( duty day, night operations, 
continuous successive days of operation, crew rest, time zones shifts, etc..)
• Conflicts with the efficiencies gained by use of overtime
• Matrix becomes a tool to evaluate the risk
• May lead to an acceptance of an elevated risk by management or specific hazard
• Enables aircrew and maintenance to counter pressures from projects
Significant Thrusts
• Development and management of hazard portfolio
• Recognizes the continuous need to mange risks as operational and factors 
change (addition of new aircraft, significant project expansion, etc…)
• Provides for management acceptance of risk
• Records history of implemented and proposed mitigations
• Records history of precursors and events that signal hazard manifestation
• Progress slow and  buy-in is essential
• One more activity that requires considerable effort to see the benefit
• Time is the limiting resource  
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Finding Answers
• Most data is reactive
• Mainly Close calls and mishaps
• Fleet limitations/diversity, culture and sample size are challenges
• FOQA solutions not easy or culturally acceptable
• Aircraft fleet is aging and always a decade or two behind the state of 
the art in terms of avionics
• Upgrades can be singular, costly or not possible
• Proactive activity – looking for precursors
• Hazard Institutionalization  - common hazards that touch more than one 
platform.  
• Analyzes changes to the process/organization from common threat viewpoints
The current Horizon and Vision
• Looking to institutionalize a recognition of Human Factors affecting 
aircraft maintenance safety.
• Using a Threat & Error identification and mitigation approach to risk 
management
• Proactive, real time and reactive
• Culturally looking to instill a vision for excellence in aircraft 
maintenance with process view based upon continual improvement
• Challenges
• Fixing the process while executing a significant workload
• Fiscal enabling  will require cuts in ongoing “necessities”
Flight Test Safety
• Most mishaps in this domain are not test related
• Inherent focus on changes from nominal ops threats & errors
• Structured airworthiness process
• Cockpit review committee
• Exposure is limited
• Loss here more closely related to organizational reputation
• Process is championed by an SES
• Expansion of unmanned platforms brings challenges to process
• Aircrew safety  shifts the loss equation to largely mission
• Platforms are typically spawned under limited budget increased risk approach
Flight Test Safety Challenges
• Use of Commercial aircraft test services comes at somewhat hidden 
costs
• Public use responsibility requires airworthiness responsibility remains with 
gov’t
• Reaching deep enough across proprietary boundaries is a challenge
• Use of unmanned systems as a pathway to research progress
• Systems on a large scale are manpower intensive for planning and execution
• Smaller systems chosen to accept greater mission risk – tends to work against 
the requirement to understand the root cause to failure.  
